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IT IS 6 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT
®
Global forum
The Iranian quagmire: How to
move forward.




As the writers in this symposium illustrate, dealing with Iran's nuclear program is one of the most important
foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it
difficult to see exactly where progress has been made and what efforts are worth pursuing. In this Global
Forum, leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on the options for how to move forward
with IranÑfrom diplomacy to fuel swaps to military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers
express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering (2010),
Lawrence J. Korb (2010), and Bennett Ramberg (2010); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; from Iran, Kayhan
Barzegar (2010); and from Israel, Emily B. Landau (2010). Over the months of November and December, this
forum will continue at www.thebulletin.org.
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I
ranÕs nuclear program entered a new
phase of ambiguity as to the ambitions
of its clerical leaders with the start of
operations in the Bushehr nuclear power
plant in August 2010Ñalmost a decade
later than scheduled, according to the
January 1995 contract signed in Tehran
between Russia and Iran. The implica-
tions of IranÕs nuclear program, the chal-
lenges and risks it could pose to
international security and stability, con-
tinue to be among the most hotly
debated topics in political, military, and
academic circles around the world.
While the consequences of IranÕs
eventual weaponization of its nuclear
capabilities and the implications in
terms of the security of the countries in
the Middle East constitute one side of
this debate, the other side of the debate
focuses on the consequences of the steps
that may be taken to stop such a contin-
gency and whether a military operation
against IranÕs nuclear facilities to
achieve such a goal would be a remedy
to the problem, or whether it would
aggravate the situation even further.
Each side of the debate has a powerful
case, accompanied by convincing argu-
ments and substantiating facts and
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figuresÑon the one hand, assertions that
carefully planned, surgical military
strikes at selected sites would bring
down not only the technological capabil-
ities of Iran but also the morale of the
Iranian society and its clerical leaders,
and thus considerably retard, if not
definitely put a halt to, IranÕs ambitions
to develop nuclear weapons; and, on the
other hand, suggestions of non-military
measures, such as diplomacy, to ensure
Iran observes the norms of the interna-
tional community.
That said, the question is not which
argument makes more sense but,
rather, whether any of these arguments
would really serve to break the apparent
deadlock, where stakes are high for all
parties concerned. A military operation
against IranÕs nuclear facilitiesÑno
matter how sophisticated or militarily
successfulÑwill not thwart IranÕs
nuclear ambitions once and for all; nor
will shallow and incomplete diplomatic
initiatives bring Iran to terms with its
legally binding obligations and responsi-
bilities toward the international commu-
nity as stated in Article III of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Many
suggestions in the debate on Iran
would not halt the military dimensions
of IranÕs nuclear program. So, then,
what course of action should the inter-
national community adopt and
implement?
Military strikes or shallow
diplomatic initiatives won’t
solve the problem
Neither the military option nor shallow
diplomacy will help Iran meet the inter-
national communityÕs expectations that
it act responsibly with respect to its
obligations and rights stemming from
Article IV of the NPT. Shallow
diplomacy here denotes ad hoc diplo-
matic initiatives not supported by
comprehensive and long-term action
plans, underwritten by powerful govern-
mental assurances of the states involved,
and also those conditional upon IranÕs
taking some steps, beforehand, in the
direction prescribed by those states.
Drawbacks of military option
Regarding the military option, the most
important questions are not how many
nuclear facilities does Iran have and
where are they located, or which are
dummy sites built with the sole purpose
of fooling the enemy. The question
is whether IranÕs determination to
become a nuclear power will be weak-
ened as a result of a successful military
operation.
Before considering anything else, one
must bear in mind that the Iranian
population is highly committed to
going ahead with all the aspects of the
countryÕs nuclear program, and this is
possibly the single most important
issue uniting the diverse groups within
Iranian society, regardless of their deep
divergence of opinion vis-ˆ-vis other
political, economic, and even cultural
issues.1 There are basically two reasons
why Iranian society lends its utmost
support to the nuclear program. One is
the belief that nuclear weapon capability
will answer the security needs of the
country in the face of the perceived
threats, especially from the United
States and Israel. Second, most
IraniansÑfrom the average person on
the street to the countryÕs intellectuals
and clerical leadersÑbelieve it is IranÕs
solemn duty to elevate the country to the

































world, one characteristic of which is the
possession of nuclear power; moreover,
they believe they must achieve this goal
to be true to the Òglorious pastÓ of their
centuries-old Persian civilization (Del
Giudice, 2008).2 The following views of
an Iranian scholar perfectly summarize
the atmosphere in the Iranian public
domain:
Three pillars of Iranian strategic thinking are
important to understand. The first is IraniansÕ
sense of victimization [because of the attitude
of the West after the Islamic Revolution, espe-
cially during the war with Iraq]. Second is
IraniansÕ quest for recognition. Third is conti-
nuity with the pre-Revolutionary period. Iran
is a proud country, a big country, and a leading
country. This must be recognized. The sense
of Iran as a leading country is something to
which the leadership pays heavy attention.
The psychological deficit within the
Iranian leadership could be fulfilled by devel-
oping nuclear weapons capability. (Kibaroglu,
2006: 219)3
Against this backdrop, it seems
unlikely that a military operation
would succeedÑmilitarily or politi-
callyÑespecially given the lack of
precise intelligence about the location
of every Iranian nuclear facility of
potential significance to the countryÕs
nuclear aspirations. It must also
be remembered that, following the
inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the
Qom enrichment facility, which was
unearthed while under construction,
the officials admitted that the agency
was not in a position to confirm there
were no other secret nuclear facilities
in Iran.4 Hence, the military option is
actually not an option, because an
attack, even if devastating, could
make Iran even more powerful and
harden the resolve of the Iranian
leadership to acquire nuclear weapon
capability, given that the nuclear
knowledge and technical know-how




If the military option is not an option,
then who will stop Iran from advancing
its nuclear capabilities and how? This is
a very valid question. And the answer is
to pursue effective diplomacy, rather
than shallow diplomatic initiatives that
are seemingly designed to augment
some countriesÕ or individualsÕ profiles
in the international arena (or so they
seem to believe).
Iran has a very long history of ruling
large territories across the Eurasian
landscape, thereby building strong
diplomatic skills and acquiring vast
knowledge about world politics. One
should not, therefore, confuse the
current Iranian administration with
what Western policy analysts perceive
as a ÒtypicalÓ Middle Eastern state struc-
tureÑthat is, one heavily dependent on a
male leader and his entourage of close
family members, who, in times of crisis,
may not necessarily display the resolve
to serve his country. Iran has a long and
solid tradition of statehood, and regard-
less of the regimeÕs characteristics,
Iranian diplomats, even though they
may not be masterminds of contempo-
rary diplomacy, are known for making
negotiations difficult for their counter-
parts. They cannot be easily fooled
with superficial proposals that may
lead nowhere. Iranians want to be
taken seriously and offered comprehen-
sive proposals with long-term implica-
tions for the security and prosperity of
their country.
































Notwithstanding the expectations of
the Iranian leadership to be taken more
seriously, especially by Western coun-
tries, most diplomatic initiatives so far
have been either non-startersÑsetting
out conditions before any incremental
step could be taken in favor of IranÑor
have not been pursued long enough,
with sufficient patience and good faith,
on the grounds that Iran would cheat
anyway. The following statement
summarizes the prevailing view in
Western political circles:
The EU-3 argue that Iran cannot be trusted to
control the whole nuclear fuel-cycleÑeven
under international supervision. They fear
that technology developed under a pilot
scheme could be used in a secret military
project. They argue that IranÕs history of
pursuing a covert programme for 18 years
means that it cannot be given the benefit of
the doubt. Therefore, the only way Iran
could provide a satisfactory guarantee would
be to announce a permanent end to all uranium
enrichment activities, to be verified by inter-
national inspections. (Leonard, 2005: 6)
This attitude, pervasive in the West,
does indeed play into the hands of the
Iranian administration. It gives Iran the
opportunity to exploit the situation:
Under the pretext of being treated as
an ÒoutlawÓ state, Iran feels justified in
further distancing itself from the outer
worldÕs scrutiny.
What can be done to thwart Iran’s
nuclear ambitions?
What needs to be done to thwart IranÕs
nuclear ambitions? This is truly a
Ò$64,000 question,Ó and not at all easy
to answer. It is easier to postulate
arguments about what is not feasible
or what is wrong, and why. However,
it is difficultÑespecially after having
explored numerous options for thwart-
ing IranÕs nuclear ambitionsÑto offer
policy suggestions that both make
sense and are feasible.
That said, there are many reasons
a multilateral initiative must be given a
genuine opportunity to help achieve a
lasting solution to the problem. Though
unexpectedly aborted, this initia-
tiveÑnamely the Ònuclear swap dealÓ
agreed by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran in
Tehran on May 17, 2010Ñmust be resus-
citated and then truly exploited by the
international community with all possi-
ble extensions attached to it, such as not
going ahead with enrichment activities
until the end of the swap period, as a
confidence-building measure.
The nuclear swap deal was literally
the one and only document Iran ever
signed over the many years since the
debate on its nuclear program began
to dominate international political
discourse. Iranians flatly rejected allega-
tions of pursuing a hidden agenda to
create a nuclear weapon and opposed
any proposals that required them to
stop or suspend any of the sensi-
tive activities in their nuclear pro-
gram, such as uranium enrichment,
citing its inalienable right to bene-
fit from peaceful applications of
nuclear energy. There was a short
period between late 2003 and early
2005, during which Iran cooperated
with both the IAEA and the
EU-3Ñthe United Kingdom, France,
and GermanyÑwhich offered Iran sev-
eral political and economic incentives in
return for allowing the IAEA inspectors
to visit a number of military sites such as
the Parchin Military Base near Tehran,
and to suspend the installation of centri-
fuges to the Natanz enrichment facility.

































incentives were officially documented
or made mandatory for
IranÑÒpromisesÓ were to constitute
the basis of cooperation. Similarly,
IranÕs primary and only (other than the
alleged ÒA. Q. Khan networkÓ) nuclear
technology supplier, namely Russia,
which built the Bushehr nuclear power
plant, also worked hard in the second
half of 2009 to convince Iran to sign an
agreement that would have resulted in
the removal of a significant amount of
low-enriched uranium (LEU) produced
in Natanz. These efforts failed after
Òlong and tiring deliberations.Ó5
However, in 2010, Turkey, a neighbor
and, indeed, historic rival of Iran,
worked hard and finally succeeded,
with the support of Brazil, in bringing
Iran to the negotiating table and in
securing the signing of the Joint
Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey, Iran, and Brazil in
Tehran in May. The signing ceremony
was given further moral support by the
participation of Turkish Prime Minister
R. Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Brazilian
President Lula da Silva.
With the Joint Declaration, Iran
agreed, among other things, to store
some 1,200 kg of its LEU in Turkey for
12 months; at the end of this time, the
Vienna Group, composed of the United
States, France, Russia, and the IAEA,
would give Iran 120 kg of uranium
enriched to 20 percent to be used in the
Tehran Research Reactor to create med-
ical isotopes. The so-called Òswap dealÓ
was not, of course, the end of the story,
solving all the problems between Iran
and the West. However, in paragraph
three of the Joint Declaration, the three
signatories state that they Òbelieve
that the nuclear fuel exchange is
instrumental in initiating cooperation in
different areas, especially with regard to
peaceful nuclear cooperation including
nuclear power plant and research reac-
tors constructionÓ (Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2010). In the same vein,
it was also declared that Òbased on this
point the nuclear fuel exchange is a start-
ing point to begin cooperation and a pos-
itive constructive move forward among
nationsÓ (Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2010).
However, this unique opportunity
was killed in action by the countries,
such as the United States, that have
long accused Iran of not cooperating
enough or not coming to the negotiation
table in good faith; but also by the
European Union, Russia, and China
who lent no support to the genuine
(and fruitful) efforts of Turkey and
Brazil. No one can explain why the
United States abruptly changed its
position on the deal, with Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton calling it Òa trans-
parent ploy to avoid Security Council
actionÓ (CBS News, 2010) only 27 days
after President Barack Obama had
written to BrazilÕs da Silva (on April
20) suggesting they try to get Iran to
agree to terms almost identical to those
in the May 17 swap deal. Apparently, the
deal fell victim to the political rift
between the US presidentÕs office and
the State Department.
Had TurkeyÕs (and BrazilÕs) efforts
been endorsed by the leading powers
of the world, relations with Iran might
have been put on a healthy track,
whereby the Iranian clerical leaders
could agree to further steps that would
eventually lead to the normalization of
relations between Iran with the Western
world. Turkey used its growing Òsoft
powerÓ and its genuine desire to solve
































this problem on Iran. There are tangible
signs that TurkeyÕs efforts, in particular,
could result in further agreements with
Iran with respect to its nuclear program.
One may ask whatÕs at stake for
Turkey in this puzzle. There are three
issues that must be considered. First of
all, in October 2008, Turkey was elected
to the United Nations Security Council
as a Non-Permanent Member for 2009
and 2010. Hence, it is TurkeyÕs duty to
take part in activities that aim to
preserve peace and security in the
world, and the question of IranÕs nuclear
ambitions is obviously an issue of inter-
national security. So, Turkey could not
stay out of it. Second, Turkey does not
want either the United States or Israel to
justify a military operation on the
pretext that Iran is escaping any diplo-
matic solution. Third, Turkey does not
want Iran to justify the further advance
of its nuclear capabilities (by, for
instance, enriching its LEU up to
20 percent) on the pretext of not getting
enough support from the rest of the
world. It must be clearly understood
that Turkey does not want Iran to
develop nuclear weapons. Nor does it
want to see other countries in the
region with nuclear weapons capability.
Why? Because ÒTurkey is a country that
will be most negatively affected by IranÕs
nuclear-weapons capability, if and when
it is developedÓ (Kibaroglu and Caglar,
2008: 59).
Hence, the nuclear swap deal must be
taken out of the fridge and put back on
the negotiating table with the support of
the international community. Only by
making Iran sign legally binding docu-
ments which address the countryÕs
contemporary security concerns and
economic needs, will Iranian nuclear
ambitions be thwarted. No one can say
this is a sure way to succeed, but it is
much more likely to produce tangible
results than are other options, and,
therefore, absolutely worth another try,
before itÕs too late.
Notes
1. Iranian intellectuals, scholars, and govern-
ment officials, in private conversations,
generally express the view that Iran should
advance its nuclear program, at least, to the
level of Japan and Germany in terms of
scientific and technological capabilities.
Because, they believe, only then may they
both entertain the peaceful applications of
nuclear energy on a large scale and also even-
tually weaponize their peaceful nuclear
capability, if need be, in the case that there
is a serious perceived threat.
2. The recorded history of Iran spans some
2,500 years that makes most Iranians proud.
Iranians claim that Òat one time the area of
the country was triple what it is now, and it
was a stable superpower for more than a
thousand years,Ó and that they Òhave a
nostalgia to be a superpower again.Ó For
research on IranÕs Òglorious pastÓ, see Del
Giudice (2008).
3. Views expressed by Dr. Gholamali
Chegnizadeh, from the Faculty of Law and
Political Science at the University of
Allame Tabatabaee in Tehran, during the
authorÕs research in Iran in 2005, and
quoted in Kibaroglu (2006).
4. Authorities in the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) complain about the
level of cooperation between the agency and
Iran on a number of issues including the
Òpossible military dimensionsÓ of some of
the activities in Iranian nuclear facilities.
The following excerpt from the IAEAÕs
board report may be an indicator of the
lack of satisfaction of agency officials with
IranÕs performance. Section G, paragraph 35
of the report reads as follows: ÒBased on an
overall analysis undertaken by the Agency
of all the information available to it, the
Agency remains concerned about the possi-
ble existence in Iran of past or current undi-

































military related organizations, including
activities related to the development of a
nuclear payload for a missile. There are indi-
cations that certain of these activities
may have continued beyond 2004Ó (IAEA,
2010: 8).
5. Conversations with Russian colleagues
(not to be disclosed here) involved in these
deliberations throughout the second half
of 2009.
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